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NOTE
SECURITIES FRAUD, OFFICER AND DIRECTOR
BARS, AND THE “UNFITNESS” INQUIRY
AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY
Jon Carlson ∗
INTRODUCTION
In early 1988, Ratilal Patel and Dilip Shah were executives of two
successful and related pharmaceutical companies. 1 Patel was a founder,
director, and officer of Par Pharmaceuticals; Shah was the president of
Par’s subsidiary Quad Pharmaceuticals. 2 Par and Quad were rising stars
in the generic drug industry, and long-term investors in Par were undoubtedly delighted by the steady gains in the company’s stock price. 3
In the summer of 2008, however, the good times came to an abrupt end
when federal prosecutors indicted Patel and Shah for their roles in
bribing and defrauding the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), acts
that had resulted in the distribution of untested and unapproved versions
of the companies’ drugs to consumers. 4 The market for Par stock
∗
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1. SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 138 (2d Cir. 1995); SEC v. Patel, No. 93 Civ. 4603,
1994 WL 364089, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1994); SEC v. Shah, No. 92 Civ. 1952, 1993
WL 288285, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1993).
2. Patel, 61 F.3d at 138; Shah, 1993 WL 288285, at *1.
3. See Yahoo! Finance, Historical Prices, Par Pharm. Cos., Inc. (PRX), http://fin
ance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=PRX&a=11&b=30&c=1987&d=00&e=2&f=2009&g=d&z=66
&y=5214(last visited Feb. 23, 2009) (listing historical daily closing price of Par stock
from Dec. 1987 – Mar. 1988).
4. Patel, 61 F.3d at 138; Patel, 1994 WL 364089, at *1; Shah, 1993 WL 288285,
at *2. Though Shah and Patel were only charged with bribing a public official, their
scheme also may have violated the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The shipping of adulterated or mislabeled food or drugs is a serious offense, and managers of

679

680

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XIV

reacted swiftly: the price dropped from $17.37 to $10.12 in the course
of three months. 5
The scandal went far beyond what prosecutors initially thought had
occurred. Not only had Shah and Patel sabotaged the mechanisms that
were designed to ensure the safety of their drugs, they had also begun
selling their Par stock prior to the public announcement of their misconduct with the FDA. 6 Consequently, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) sued, alleging fraud, and sought to have both men
permanently barred from serving as managers of any publicly traded
company. 7 In both cases, however, the courts ultimately held that the
managers’ misconduct did not justify such a remedy. 8
At this moment, Shah and Patel may be in a boardroom, managing
a company owned by widely dispersed members of the public. Why
would any rational person invest in a company run by someone like
Shah or Patel? In some cases, public investors have no meaningful
choice in the matter because they do not know of the current management’s prior wrongdoing. 9 In other cases, shareholders are the direct
beneficiaries of corporate misconduct and thus have no incentive to oust
misbehaving management. 10 Why would the government allow such a
person to continue serving in a position of public trust? Simply put, it
does not allow it. 11
For many years, the SEC has sought to bar corporate managers and
others whose illegal misconduct shows contempt or disregard for the nation’s scheme of securities regulation. 12 Federal securities regulation is

corporations charged with such a violation can be held strictly liable. See United States
v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671 (1975) (discussing the case law’s position that managers
must be held accountable and holding CEO strictly liable for the company’s violation of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
5. On July 13, 1988, the stock closed at $17.375. Shah, 1993 WL 288285, at *2.
By October 24, 1988, the price had fallen to $10.12, with sharp declines occurring as
more negative press was released. Id. The price fell to $7.125 by July 25, 1989. Patel,
61 F.3d at 139.
6. Patel, 1994 WL 364089, at *1; Shah, 1993 WL 288285, at *1.
7. Patel, 1994 WL 364089, at *1-2; Shah, 1993 WL 288285, at *3.
8. Patel, 61 F.3d at 142; Shah, 1993 WL 288285, at *7.
9. Dispersed shareholders may also lack the control necessary to oust a violating
manager once they have learned of the violation. S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 18 (1990).
10. Id.
11. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2008); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C § 78(u)(d)(2) (2008).
12. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-616, at 31-32 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
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designed to promote free and efficient capital markets by ensuring that
up-to-date information flows freely from corporate issuers to the
public. 13 By introducing untrue or misleading information into the market, fraud undermines this freedom and efficiency. 14 Securities fraud is
a serious violation and violators are subject to a variety of securities law
sanctions, including monetary penalties, disgorgement, occupational
bars, and imprisonment. 15 The SEC has used the officer and director bar
particularly to prevent perpetrators of fraud from serving as fiduciaries
to the public. 16
This Note examines the federal courts’ inconsistent and problematic
interpretations of the officer and director bar statutes and proposes a
solution that satisfies Congress’s intent and that is fair both to the SEC
and to the defendants in enforcement proceedings. Part I reviews the
history of the officer and director bar as a remedy for securities fraud
violations. It concludes by explaining how Congress responded to cases
like Shah and Patel in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SarbanesOxley”). Part II categorizes and discusses the various approaches that
federal courts have taken in interpreting and applying the officer and director bar after Congress amended the bar statutes in Sarbanes-Oxley.
So far, few courts have demonstrated a clear understanding of the
amended statutes. Part III draws from the history of the officer and director bar, including the events leading up to the passage of SarbanesOxley, to propose a solution that is consistent with the legislative purpose of the amended statutes and the past seventy years of securities enforcement.
I.
The officer and director bar has had a tortuous history in both federal legislation and the courts. Knowledge of this history is essential to
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1394-95.
13. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 36-38 (5th ed. 2004) (explaining how the “disclosure philosophy” of
securities regulation came to be the scheme embodied in the federal securities laws).
14. See, e.g., Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
119, 147 (2002).
15. See generally Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) [hereinafter Remedies Act]
(providing examples of stated remedies for instances of fraud).
16. H.R. REP. NO.101-616, at 13 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379,
1380.
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understanding the meaning of the most recent amendment to the officer
and director bar statutes. 17
A. Injunction
The director and officer bar originated as a form of injunctive relief
for violations of the securities laws. Prior to 1984, the only remedy expressly provided for such violations was an injunction against future violations. 18 The first courts to issue officer and director bars did so by
fashioning injunctions that specifically prohibited defendants from further service as corporate executives. 19 The significance of the bar’s origin is more than historical: the legal standards for and limitations on imposing injunctive relief continue to be influential in defining the reach of
the modern officer and director bar.
Generally speaking, an SEC injunction is a broad obey-the-law
order prohibiting the defendant from future violations of securities
laws. 20 Critics argue that such an injunction serves only as a slap on the
wrist because it does little to deter first-time violations, does not provide
restitution for the victims of violations, and imposes few, if any, costs on
securities violators who may have profited enormously from their misconduct. 21 An injunction is, in the words of the Supreme Court, a “mild
prophylactic.” 22
The power of an injunction is its effect on the defendant’s future
conduct. Those who continue their misconduct despite an injunction
face substantial penalties, including civil or criminal contempt. 23 Those
who obey the injunction may face other costs, including reputational

17. The most recent amendment is in section 305 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d) (2006).
18. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 was the first piece of legislation to
grant the SEC the authority to seek relief other than an injunction. See S. REP. NO. 101337, at 6 (1990).
19. See, e.g., SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 53 (7th Cir.
1972); SEC v. Wong, 252 F. Supp. 608 (D.P.R. 1966).
20. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2008); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2008).
21. S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 6.
22. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963).
23. See, e.g., SEC v. Universal Express, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 132, 142 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (ordering defendant to turn himself over for incarceration for failing to comply
with equitable remedy of disgorgement).
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damage or stigma. 24 Therefore, while an injunction may be sufficient to
correct the behavior of a past violator, it does not have a significant preventive effect against first time violations.
Perhaps in recognition of the need for more effective remedies,
courts began to develop separate “ancillary” remedies to supplement the
general injunction. 25 An injunction was traditionally a remedy of courts
of equity, and courts of equity have long fashioned other rules and
remedies to suit the particular facts of a case. 26 Federal courts undertook
to create such forms of “ancillary relief” in securities enforcement actions by reasoning that the SEC injunction actions provided them with
equity jurisdiction over the case. 27 Courts willingly adapted these new
remedies when it was “necessary and proper” to do so. 28 Among the
forms of ancillary relief created by the courts were disgorgement of illgotten profits, as well as the officer and director bar. 29 Early cases barring defendants from serving as officers and directors specially emphasized the importance of such action when it was necessary to protect
public investors, as this is the general purpose of the securities laws. 30
Once the SEC has sufficiently established that a defendant has violated a provision of the securities laws, a court may grant an injunction
or ancillary relief if the defendant’s past conduct indicates that there is a
reasonable likelihood of future violations. 31 The underlying violation,
without more, is insufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of recurrence. 32
In assessing the likelihood of future violations, courts most commonly
consider the following factors: (1) the defendant’s history of past
violations, (2) the degree of scienter involved in violations, (3) whether
the violations are isolated or recurring and continuous, (4) the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility and assurances against future miscon-

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 703 (1980).
See, e.g., SEC v. Posner, 16 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 1994).
SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1984).
SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 53 (7th Cir. 1972).
H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 28 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379,

1394.
29. Id. at 1398.
30. See Advance Growth Capital, 470 F.2d at 53-54.
31. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 856-57 (2d Cir. 1968).
32. SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334 (5th Cir. 1978); see SEC v. Jones, 476 F.
Supp. 2d 374, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying the SEC’s request for an injunction where
the SEC demonstrated only past misconduct).
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duct, and (5) whether the defendant’s occupation puts him or her in a
position to commit further violations. 33
The likelihood of recurrence standard for obtaining an injunction
and its five-factor test continue to be important in officer and director
bar cases in two ways. First, courts still enjoin persons from acting as
officers or directors as a form of ancillary relief under their general equitable power to impose an injunction. 34 In those cases, proof of a violation and a showing that the defendant is likely to engage in future misconduct are the only requirements. 35 Second, under more recent cases
involving the express officer and director bar statutes, courts have returned to the likelihood of recurrence standard when determining the
propriety of permanently barring a corporate executive. 36
B. The Remedies Act
In 1990, Congress passed the Securities Enforcement Remedies and
Penny Stock Reform Act (“Remedies Act”) in response to the “wide
range of securities law violations in the large and increasingly complex
The Remedies Act amended the existing
securities markets.” 37
securities laws by granting the SEC the express authority to seek several
new remedies, including officer and director bars. 38
Congress’s stated purpose in passing the Remedies Act was to grant
the SEC the authority and flexibility to “maximize the remedial effects
of its enforcement actions” and to “achieve the appropriate level of de-

33. SEC v. Cavanaugh, 155 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 1998); SEC v. First Jersey Sec.,
Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1477-78 (2d Cir. 1996); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546
F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1976).
34. See, e.g., SEC v. Posner, 16 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 1994).
35. See generally id. at 521-22 (“The court found that they had committed securities law violations . . . and that their past securities law violations and lack of assurances
against future violations demonstrated that such violations were likely to continue.”);
SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 587, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“The
propriety of injunctive relief turns on whether ‘there is a reasonable likelihood that the
wrong will be repeated.’”).
36. See infra Part I.D.
37. H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 14 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379,
1381.
38. Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 101-429, §§ 101, 201, 104 Stat. 931, 932, 935
(1990).
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terrence in each case.” 39 Implicit in this purpose was the view that the
securities market was expanding beyond the SEC’s enforcement capacity and that injunctions, the SEC’s sole remedy up to that point, were inadequate to deter misconduct and too cumbersome to adapt to a specific
defendant’s violation. 40 Congress designed the Remedies Act to do more
than expressly provide for remedies that were already implied. Rather,
the Remedies Act was designed to strengthen the SEC’s enforcement
program and to deter violations. 41
In terms of general deterrence, the officer and director bar is one of
the most effective enforcement mechanisms at the SEC’s disposal. To a
corporate executive, a bar order may be more devastating than a monetary fine or even imprisonment. 42 Indeed, it is intended to be: the director and officer bar serves as a pecuniary sanction for wealthy fiduciaries
who are likely to view a fine as an inconsequential cost of doing business. 43 Nevertheless, the officer and director bar is not a one-size-fits-all
remedy. It is a severe sanction that may force a corporate executive to
abandon her career and possibly her lifestyle. 44 In contrast, to a lowerranking violator who has never served as a corporate manager and is
unlikely to do so in the future, the officer and director bar may be an
ineffective deterrent and would be less painful than a civil monetary
penalty. 45 The legislative history makes clear, however, that Congress’s
39. H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 13 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379,
1380.
40. See id at 1381. The legislative history provides statistics showing the rapid
growth of the securities markets in the decade leading up to the Remedies Act. The
market boom and the concern that the SEC may not be able to police misconduct serve
as premises for the conclusion that expresses remedies (and therefore more deterrence)
is necessary. The report does not state that the SEC’s sole remedy of injunction is
insufficient to enforce and deter, but this is obviously an assumption.
41. Id.
42. Jayne W. Barnard, When Is a Corporate Executive “Substantially Unfit to
Serve”?, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1489, 1522 (1992) [hereinafter Barnard, Substantially Unfit to
Serve?] (arguing that an officer and director bar is harsher than imprisonment because it
deprives corporate executives of the potential ever to find a high-paying job).
43. Id. at 1495.
44. Barnard, Substantially Unfit to Serve?, supra note 42, at 12. Note, however,
that not all barred executives are in danger of losing everything. See, e.g., SEC v.
Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 837 F. Supp. 587, 596, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (barring
defendants who were wealthy controlling shareholders of numerous corporations from
exercising control or voting rights over the corporations).
45. SEC v. Drucker, 528 F. Supp. 2d 450, 451, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (barring
defendant who committed insider trading as in-house counsel, but not barring tippee of
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intent with the officer and director bar was to deter corporate misconduct and to send a signal to public investors that the markets were safe
from the actions of proven violators. 46
In an effort to limit the potentially devastating effects of the officer
and director bar, Congress sought to apply it only to the most serious
securities laws violators. Under the Remedies Act, a court was authorized to bar “any person who violated [either of the ‘hard core’ fraud
provisions 47 ] from acting as an officer or director of any [public
company] if the person’s conduct demonstrates substantial unfitness to
serve as an officer or director of any such issuer.” 48
Separated into its key components, the bar statute applied (1) to any
person; (2) who was found by a court to have engaged in securities
fraud; and (3) who was found to be substantially unfit to serve as an
officer or director of a public company. 49 Thus, to obtain a bar, the SEC
had a two-part burden: it was required to show fraud plus substantial
unfitness by a preponderance of the evidence. 50
Once a court has imposed an officer and director bar, it only
prohibits the defendant from acting as an officer or director of a public
company. 51 The term “public company” refers to a company that has
over $1,000,000 in assets and more than 500 shareholders. 52 Simply
put, a public company is a corporation whose stock is held by a large
number of widely dispersed shareholders. The securities laws protect
the shareholders of such widely held corporations because they are less
likely to have the knowledge, sophistication, or control sufficient to hire
and fire management. 53 Nothing, however, prohibits a barred officer or
inside information who was a retired police officer and was never likely to serve as a
corporate manager).
46. H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 27 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379,
1394.
47. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 1510.
48. Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 101-429, §§ 101, 201,104 Stat. 931, 932, 935
(1990).
49. Id.
50. See Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1139 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding
preponderance of the evidence is the proper burden of proof in all SEC enforcement
actions including debarment cases).
51. See Remedies Act, §§ 101, 201.
52. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C § 78l (2000).
53. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953) (defining the
public as those people for whom the securities laws were designed to protect); S. REP.
NO. 101-337, at 21 (1990) (explaining the need for the officer and director bar because
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director from serving as a manager of a non-public company, usually
called a closely held company. Closely held companies are subject to
minimal SEC regulation 54 and have become increasingly popular with
the modern rise of “cash out” mergers 55 and other efforts to “go
private”. 56 Thus, the officer and director bar is a potentially severe
sanction for corporate executives, but Congress has limited its
application only to the most egregious violators and its reach only to
public companies.
C. Defining Substantial Unfitness and the Six-Factor Test
By the time Congress passed the Remedies Act, the elements of
securities fraud had been fairly well established. 57 The other requirement for obtaining an officer and director bar, “substantial unfitness,”
was a new term of art left undefined by the Remedies Act and the legislative history. 58 The definition of “substantial unfitness” thus became
the central issue in the case law and academic literature dealing with the
officer and director bar. 59
The definition of “substantial unfitness” was not completely ambiguous, however. Sensible construction suggested that the test for “substantial unfitness” lay between two distinct boundaries. At one end, the
defendant’s act of fraud alone, without aggravating factors, could not be
sufficient to justify a bar. After all, the required showing was fraud plus
dispersed shareholders rarely have the collective power to oust violators from management).
54. Sections 12 and 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 do not require
closely held companies to register their securities or make periodic reports. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 78(l), 78(m) (2008). Nevertheless, closely held companies and their princepals are still subject to the anti-fraud provisions, which apply to any person. See 15
U.S.C. § 78j (2008); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(q) (2000).
55. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2007) (defining “short form” or “cash out”
merger).
56. David A. Stockton et al., Going Private: The Best Option?, NAT’L L. J., June
23, 2003, at 19 (citing a study by FactSet Mergerstat indicating that completed goingprivate deals, as a percentage of mergers and acquisition transactions, increased by approximately 23.7% from 2000 to 2002).
57. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 914-18 (outlining the elements of
securities fraud and citing the court opinions that established those elements).
58. Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., SEC Div. of Enforcement, Speech by SEC Staff:
Remarks at the Glasser LegalWorks 20th Annual Federal Securities Institute (Feb. 15,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch538.htm.
59. Id.
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“substantial unfitness,” and the legislative history indicates that
Congress favored limiting the application of the bar only to the most
serious violators. 60 At the other end, the test for “substantial unfitness”
needed to be more flexible than the test required for the SEC to obtain
an injunction. If the SEC could easily establish that a defendant was
likely to commit future violations as a corporate manager, then it could
obtain a bar under its authority to seek an injunction. 61 In that case, the
officer and director bar statutes would be rendered superfluous. Therefore, “substantial unfitness” could not logically be equated with the defendant’s likelihood of recurrence plus other factors. This view was
supported by the fact that the Remedies Act was designed to enhance the
SEC enforcement program, not to hinder it. 62 With these two guidelines
in place, the “substantial unfitness” issue was left to judicial interpretation.
Courts quickly adopted a “substantial unfitness” test, initially suggested in a 1992 law review article by Professor Jayne Barnard.63
Professor Barnard suggested that to determine whether a defendant is
substantially unfit, courts should consider: (1) the egregiousness of the
underlying violation, (2) the defendant’s repeat offender status, (3) the
role of the defendant in the scheme to defraud, (4) the defendant’s degree of scienter, (5) the defendant’s economic stake in the violation, (6)
the likelihood that misconduct will recur, and (7) the defendant’s appreciation of a corporate manager’s fiduciary obligations. 64 Courts that
adopted this test abondoned the last factor and sometimes added it into
the analysis of the defendant’s likelihood of recurrence. 65
The six factors in Professor Barnard’s modified test are nearly
identical to the six factors that courts have long applied in reviewing the
propriety of sanctions imposed by the SEC in administrative proceedings. 66 In the seminal case Steadman v. SEC, the Fifth Circuit held
60. See S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 20 (1990) (stating that a permanent bar may be
especially appropriate where the defendant’s conduct was egregious or the defendant
was a recidivist).
61. See supra Part I.A.
62. H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 14 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379,
1381.
63. Cutler, supra note 58.
64. Barnard, Substantially Unfit to Serve?, supra note 42, at 1510-21.
65. See, e.g., SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995).
66. See Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979). There are a few
differences in Professor Barnard’s factors and the factors utilized by the court in
Steadman: Barnard’s factors consider the defendant’s economic stake in the violation
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that when the SEC seeks to impose an occupational bar, it must clearly
articulate its reasons for believing that such a severe sanction is more
appropriate than a less severe alternative. 67 To that end, Steadman held
that the SEC may consider and discuss: (1) the egregiousness of the defendant’s actions, (2) the isolated or recurrent nature of the infraction,
(3) the degree of scienter involved, (4) the sincerity of the defendant’s
assurances against future violations, (5) the defendant’s recognition of
the wrongful nature of his conduct, and (6) the likelihood that the defendant’s occupation will present opportunities for future violations. 68
Steadman suggested that some factors – such as the egregiousness
of the defendant’s violation, the defendant’s level of scienter and the
likelihood of recurrence – may carry more weight than others. 69
Furthermore, Steadman held that the six factors were a list of possible
considerations, and not a conjunctive test. 70 Thus, the SEC was not
required to demonstrate facts to satisfy all six factors in order to justify
its decision to impose a sanction.
Professor Barnard intended the six factor test to limit the application of the officer and director bar as a remedy for fraud. 71 She was concerned that the bar was too strict a punishment that, if applied unwisely,
could detrimentally affect shareholder agency and the lives of talented,
though tarnished, managers. 72

and the Steadman factors do not; the court in Steadman considered whether the
defendant had recognized the wrongful nature of his conduct, while Professor Barnard
asks whether the defendant understands his role as a corporate fiduciary. All other
differences are minor changes in verbiage.
67. Id. at 1139-40.
68. Id. at 1140. The Steadman factors remain the test by which federal courts
review the SEC’s imposition of any sanction in an administrative court proceeding.
See, e.g., In re KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43,862, 2001
SEC LEXIS 98, at *98 (Jan. 19, 2001) (requiring a review of the Steadman factors
before the SEC can impose sanctions in an SEC administrative proceeding); In re Maria
T. Giesge, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-12747, Initial Decision Rel. No. 359, at 31-32 (Oct.
7, 2008).
69. Steadman, 603 F.2d at 1140.
70. Id.
71. See Barnard, Substantially Unfit to Serve?, supra note 42, at 1510 (urging
courts to exercise caution as the bar “inherently invites overuse”).
72. Id. at 1522.
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D. Patel and the Application of the Six Factor Test in Court.
In 1993, the Southern District of New York became the first court
to apply Professor Barnard’s six-factor test in SEC v. Shah. 73 The SEC
sued Dilip Shah, alleging fraud in connection with Shah’s scheme to defraud the FDA and his sale of company stock before the public learned
of the government’s investigation and the subsequent indictment. 74 At
trial, Shah conceded that his trading constituted securities fraud. 75 The
SEC sought an officer and director bar and the only unresolved issue
was whether Shah was substantially unfit. The court, noting the need for
a workable definition of “substantial unfitness,” applied Professor
Barnard’s six-factor test. 76 The court’s analysis led it to conclude that
Shah was not substantially unfit, despite the fact that over a period of
several years he had endangered the public health, defrauded the federal
government and engaged in insider trading. 77 The court’s six-factor
analysis is summarized below:
(1)

(2)
(3)

(4)

(5)

73.
1993).
74.
75.
76.
77.

Egregiousness of the Underlying Violation: The violation
was not egregious because defendant avoided only a small
loss by selling ahead of the public announcement of the
indictment.
Defendant’s Repeat Offender Status: There were no past
violations of law.
Defendant’s Role in the Fraud: Shah was an officer of the
corporation and an active participant in the conspiracy to
defraud the FDA.
Defendant’s Degree of Scienter: The degree of scienter
was low because there was no evidence of clandestine
trading or tipping.
Defendant’s Economic Stake in the Violation: The defendant received all of the loss that he avoided.

SEC v. Shah, No. 92 Civ. 1952, 1993 WL 288285, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 28,
The basic facts of Shah are set out supra in the Introduction.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id.
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Likelihood that Misconduct Will Recur: The defendant is
unlikely to commit future violations given his past record,
the harshness of his criminal penalties, and the SEC’s
monetary damages. 78

In sum, Shah was the president of a public company who coordinated a scheme spanning several years to defraud the FDA and endanger
the public welfare while trading in the company’s stock. Although the
court did not find him substantially unfit, other courts have subsequently
treated similar conduct as especially relevant in terms of showing egregiousness, 79 scienter, 80 and the likelihood of recurrence. 81
Two years after Shah, the Second Circuit applied its own twist to
the six-factor test in Patel and significantly raised the SEC’s burden for
obtaining a bar in most cases. 82 The defendant in Patel was a coconspirator in Shah’s scheme to defraud the FDA. Both Patel and Shah
sold their shares of the company stock before the public learned of their
illegal acts. 83 In contrast to Shah, the Southern District of New York did
permanently bar Patel from acting as an officer or director of any public
company on essentially the same set of facts as Shah. 84 On appeal, Patel
argued that the six-factor test is “in essence a test of a defendant’s propensity for recidivism” and that the bar order issued against him should
be reversed because the district court erroneously concluded that Patel
was likely to commit future misconduct. 85 The Second Circuit agreed. 86
Elevating the sixth factor – the defendant’s likelihood of recurrence –
above all other factors, the Second Circuit held that before issuing an
officer and director bar, a district court must clearly state facts showing
a defendant’s likelihood of recurrence, especially if the defendant has no

78.
79.

Id.
See SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant’s
scheme to defraud the FDA, in addition to his acts of securities fraud, was egregious).
80. SEC v. Global Telecom Servs., LLC, 325 F. Supp. 2d 94, 121-22 (D.Conn.
2004).
81. Id.
82. Patel, 61 F.3d at 141-43.
83. Id. at 138-39.
84. SEC v. Patel, No. 93 CIV. 4603, 1994 WL 364089, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 13,
1994).
85. Brief for Defendant-Appellant Ratilal Patel at 16, SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137,
No. 94-6218 (2d Cir. Nov. 4, 1994).
86. Patel, 61 F.3d at 141-42.
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past violations. 87 Patel also held that courts should always consider
whether a temporary or conditional bar is a more appropriate remedy,
especially where the defendant has no prior history of violations. 88
Patel sought to limit the harsh effects of the officer and director bar
as a remedy against corporate executives, 89 but it created more problems
than it resolved. First, the officer and director bar was intended to be
harsh. Its purpose was to serve as a conspicuous deterrent and a powerful means of penalizing the most egregious corporate violators of the
public trust. 90 Second, the Remedies Act made the officer and director
bar an express remedy as a part of its initiative in making the SEC’s enforcement program more effective and efficient. 91 By equating “substantial unfitness” with a defendant’s likelihood of recurrence, Patel
effectively elevated the officer and director bar, as an express remedy, to
the same, if not a higher, standard than was required for a bar as a form
of ancillary injunctive relief. This was a dramatic reversal of Congress’s
desire to strengthen SEC enforcement mechanisms. Third, Patel held
that the six factors were helpful considerations but not the elements of a
mandatory or conjunctive test, which is precisely what the Steadman
court had held. 92 Nonetheless, Patel immediately abandoned this idea
by holding that a bar may not be ordered without a positive showing of
the defendant’s likelihood of recurrence. 93 Fourth, Patel’s holding made
it very unlikely that a first-time offender would be barred even if his or
her misconduct was highly egregious, weakening the bar’s effectiveness
as a deterrent. 94 Fifth, even if the Second Circuit was justified in insist-

87. Id. at 141-42; Cf. Barnard, Substantially Unfit to Serve?, supra note 42, at 1517
(stating that the defendant’s likelihood of recurrence is at the core of the test for
substantial unfitness).
88. See Patel, 61 F.3d at 142.
89. See id. at 141-42 (noting the stigma and loss of livelihood that results from an
officer and director bar).
90. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 13 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1379, 1380-81.
91. See id.
92. See Patel, 61 F.3d at 141; SEC v. Steadman, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir.
1979).
93. See Patel, 61 F.3d at 142.
94. The defendant’s conduct in Patel is a good example: the court reversed the
district court’s bar order because the defendant had no past history of securities
violations and because the district court pointed only to facts of the underlying violation
to show a likelihood of future misconduct. Id. at 141-42. Of course, it is entirely
possible that an egregious and willful violator will have no history of violations and that
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ing on a showing of Patel’s likelihood of recidivism, it could easily have
found such facts in the record. The factors sufficient to prove a defendant’s likelihood of future violations (the old test for obtaining an injunction in an SEC enforcement action) are almost identical to the first five
factors in the Steadman-Barnard six-factor test. 95 Thus, the Second
Circuit had before it sufficient facts to establish Patel’s likelihood of recurrence; nothing precluded the district court or the Second Circuit from
making such a finding.
Despite its problems, Patel became binding precedent in the Second
Circuit and was extremely influential in other circuits. 96 As a result,
courts began denying the SEC’s request for a permanent officer and
director bar even in cases where the defendant had committed egregious
and criminal acts of securities fraud. 97 Furthermore, temporary and conditional bars became much more common forms of sanctions where the
defendant was found “substantially unfit.” 98 The “substantial unfitness”
standard thus became a significant obstacle to the SEC enforcement
regime, which Congress had sought to augment in the Remedies Act.
E. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to “address the
systematic and structural weaknesses affecting [the] capital markets
which were [recently] revealed by repeated failures of” auditors, corporate managers, and broker-dealers. 99 Among the provisions designed to
the only facts available to show “substantial unfitness” are those of the underlying violation. In those cases, the fact finder will be unable to demonstrate anything more than
the prediction that an egregious violator of the public trust is likely to violate it again if
given the chance.
95. Compare note 33 and accompanying text with notes 67 & 68 and
accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 1998).
97. See, e.g., SEC v. McCaskey, No. 98 Civ. 6153, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13571,
at *18-21 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2001) (declining SEC’s request for a permanent bar of a
firm manager that had made numerous false representations to investors over a number
of years); SEC v. Farrell, No. 95-CV-6133T, 1996 WL 788367, at *8 (W.D.N.Y Nov.
6, 1996) (holding that a bar is not appropriate for a talented director who had tipped and
traded company stock prior to the announcement of a merger and was subsequently
convicted for insider trading).
98. See, e.g., SEC v. Save the World Air, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11586, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28313, at *50-52 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2005); McCaskey, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13571, at *20 (imposing six-year bar from serving as an officer or director).
99. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 2 (2002). See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at
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enhance the responsibility of corporate managers, Congress amended the
director and officer bar statutes by changing the standard for obtaining a
bar from “substantial unfitness” to mere “unfitness.” 100 Before the passing of Sarbanes-Oxley, SEC staff publicly expressed frustration with
the application of the popular six-factor test in Patel and its progeny.101
Through its communications with the SEC during the drafting process,
Congress was aware that courts had become increasingly hesitant to bar
corporate managers, even those who had engaged in egregious and criminal acts of securities fraud. 102 Indeed, Congress’s purpose in amending
the statutory language from “substantial unfitness” to “unfitness” was to
ease the courts’ reluctance to impose officer and director bars in such
cases. 103
Just as “substantial unfitness” was undefined in the Remedies Act,
“unfitness” was also undefined in Sarbanes-Oxley. Nevertheless, the
general tenor of Sarbanes-Oxley and its legislative history show that
Congress intended to make the standard less onerous on the SEC and to
signal to the courts that a change was necessary in the application of the
director and officer bar. 104 Thus, the lower standard of “unfitness,” although undefined, was Congress’s solution to Patel and its influence as
the prevailing judicial interpretation of the officer and director bar statutes.
One interpretation of the “unfitness” standard appears in a speech
by David Cutler, former Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement,
in which he suggested that a bar should be appropriate whenever a corporate executive has committed a “single serious breach of the public
trust.” 105 This interpretation is consistent with Congress’s view of the
officer and director bar as provided in the legislative history of the
Remedies Act, which states that a bar is particularly appropriate where
the defendant engaged in fraud as a corporate fiduciary 106 and the mis-

194-208 (reciting a brief history of the corporate scandals that prompted Congress to
pass Sarbanes-Oxley and a concise list of the provisions of the Act).
100. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 305, 15 U.S.C. §78u (2006); S. REP. No. 107205, at 26-27.
101. See Cutler, supra note 58.
102. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 26-27.
103. Id. at 27.
104. Id. at 26-27.
105. Cutler, supra note 58.
106. H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 31 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379,
1394.
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conduct was egregious. 107 Moreover, such a scenario likely satisfies
three of the six factors: it is egregious; the defendant is engaging in
fraud while holding the position of a corporate fiduciary; and as with all
fraud, scienter is present. 108 Such misconduct would justify a bar under
a disjunctive test like Steadman’s, but likely not under Patel’s, unless
the defendant had engaged in past misconduct or other facts clearly demonstrated a likelihood of future misconduct. 109
Sarbanes-Oxley marked a dramatic change in the way the government sought to use the officer and director bar. 110 First, Congress
clearly intended to overrule Patel and the line of cases that required the
SEC to demonstrate a likelihood of recurrence in each case. 111 Indeed,
some district courts in the Second Circuit support this view. 112 These
cases, which hold that the defendant’s likelihood of future misconduct is
not a requirement to institute a bar, support the inference that Congress
overruled Patel because courts in the Second Circuit would be bound by
stare decisis and therefore obligated to follow Patel unless it was specifically overruled. Second, Sarbanes-Oxley gave the SEC the authority
to call any person before an administrative judge and request an officer
and director bar. 113 Some commentators have criticized this power because it gives the SEC the advantage of imposing a bar before its own
tribunal and according to its own interpretation of “unfitness.” 114 These
concerns may be somewhat misguided as the SEC faces substantial evidentiary burdens in administrative actions 115 and the test for obtaining
any sanction in an SEC administrative proceeding is the Steadman sixfactor test. 116 Moreover, the SEC has sought very few officer and director bars in administrative proceedings. 117
107.
108.
109.
110.

S. REP. No. 101-337, at 17 (1990).
Grandon v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 147 F.3d 184, 194 (2d Cir. 1998).
See supra Part I.D.
See Kris Frieswick, Bar Hopping, CFO MAG., Mar. 1, 2004, available at
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3011961?f=related (quoting John X. Peloso).
111. See id.
112. See SEC v. Drucker, 528 F.Supp.2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); SEC v. Global
Telecom Servs., LLC, 325 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 2004).
113. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1105, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(f), 78u-3(f) (2006).
114. See Jayne W. Barnard, SEC Debarment of Officer and Directors After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 59 BUS. LAW. 391, 392 (2004).
115. Brian A. Ochs et al., Sanctions and Collateral Consequences, in THE
SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 211 (Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis
LLP ed., 2d ed. 2007).
116. In re KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43,862, 2001 SEC
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Despite the changes that Sarbanes-Oxley brought to the jurisprudence of the officer and director bar, its purpose is fundamentally
consistent with the purposes of the Remedies Act and the purposes of
the securities laws dating back to the original Securities Act of 1933.
The securities laws aimed to facilitate disclosure and promote fairness in
the market. 118 The SEC was meant to be the advocate for the public investor. 119 The SEC’s enforcement remedies were supposed to effectuate
restitution of illegal investor losses, punish wrongdoers, and deter potential violators. 120 Congress’s amendment to the officer and director bar
statutes in Sarbanes-Oxley was not an errant act; rather, it was
Congress’s attempt to realign those courts that strayed from the original
purposes set out by the securities laws.
II.
Most courts have yet to recognize this change. Many courts still
cite “substantial unfitness” as the standard for imposing an officer and
director bar. 121 Other courts have noted the amended language but
maintain the status quo by emphasizing the importance of the
defendant’s history of violations and the likelihood of recurrence over
other considerations. 122 Many courts also continue to follow Patel by
asking whether a temporary bar is appropriate in every case. 123 Each of
these approaches is problematic because Congress amended the bar
statutes to end the courts’ reliance on Patel, and to allay the courts’
LEXIS 98, at *98 (Jan. 19, 2001).
117. Ochs et al., supra note 115, at 211-12.
118. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).
119. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 157 (3d ed.
2003).
120. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 13 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1379, 1381-82.
121. See, e.g., SEC v. Aqua Vie Beverage Corp., No. CV 04-414-S-EJL, 2008 WL
1914723, at *2 (D. Idaho Apr. 29, 2008); SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int’l, Corp., No.
04CV2105, 2007 WL 1238707, at *14-15 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2007) (overruled on other
grounds); SEC v. Universal Express, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 2d 412, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2007);
SEC v. Pardue, 367 F. Supp. 2d 773, 776-77 (E.D. Penn. 2005); SEC v. Johnson, No.
02-5490, 2004 WL 5561799, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2004).
122. See, e.g., SEC v. Koenig, 532 F. Supp. 2d 987, 993-94 (N.D. Ill. 2007)
(granting officer and director bar after considering factors and specifically determining
that there was a likelihood that defendant would engage in future misconduct).
123. See, e.g., SEC v. Save the World Air, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11586, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28313, at *50-52 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2005).
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reluctance to permanently bar individuals who cannot be trusted as
corporate fiduciaries. 124 Because the bulk of the case law following
Sarbanes-Oxley demonstrates that the courts misunderstand the director
and officer bar amendment, Congress’s intent has yet to be fulfilled.
A. Courts Still Cite “Substantial Unfitness” as Standard
Most of the case law after Sarbanes-Oxley demonstrates that courts
remain unaware of the amended officer and director unfitness standard.
In these cases, the courts continue to state that the imposition of an officer and director bar requires a showing of “substantial unfitness.”125
These courts have stated the law incorrectly. Furthermore, these opinions show that courts have misunderstood those aspects of the “substantial unfitness” test that Sarbanes-Oxley sought to rectify. 126 Many of
these courts continue to cite Patel, not only as the genesis of the sixfactor test, but also for the position that a temporary bar should always
be considered before imposing a permanent bar. 127 Moreover, these
courts’ analyses continue to place too much emphasis on the defendant’s
likelihood of recurrence. 128 Thus, it is insufficient to say that these opinions have simply neglected to state the correct “unfitness” standard; the
greater problem lies in their failure to observe the fundamental change in
the law brought about by Sarbanes-Oxley.
B. Courts Note Change in Statutory Language
But Have Not Changed Analysis
Some courts have acknowledged the linguistic change from
“substantial unfitness” to “unfitness,” but have not yet adjusted the substance of the test accordingly. 129 In essence, for these courts, the words
124.
125.

S. REP. No. 107-205, at 26-27 (2002).
See, e.g., Aqua Vie Beverage Corp., 2008 WL 1914723, at *2; Platforms
Wireless Int’l, Corp., 2007 WL 1238707, at *14-15; Universal Express, 475 F. Supp. 2d
at 429; Pardue, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 776-77; Johnson, 2004 WL 5561799, at *4.
126. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
127. See Aqua Vie Beverage Corp., 2008 WL 1914723, at *2 (stating standard is
substantial unfitness and granting a temporary bar); Platforms Wireless Int’l, Corp.,
2007 WL 1238707, at *14-15.
128. See, e.g., SEC v. Koenig, 532 F. Supp. 2d 987, 993-94 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
129. See SEC v. Save the World Air, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11586, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28313, at *48-52 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2005) (citing standard as “unfitness” but
temporarily barring defendant who had no past history of violations in the United
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have changed, but the meaning remains the same. 130 This is problematic
for two reasons. First, it suggests that Patel retains considerable influence despite Congress’s determination to overrule Patel in SarbanesOxley. Second, to the extent that courts have noted a change in the language, it is unclear why so few have openly stated the issue and attempted to find an acceptable interpretation of the new “unfitness” standard. 131
C. Courts Offer No Analysis
A few courts since Sarbanes-Oxley have adjusted their analysis in
response to the amended standard by completely dispensing with any
determination of the defendant’s “unfitness.” 132 This approach, in which
courts try to satisfy the lesser “unfitness” standard with lax legal analysis, is unacceptable. The purpose of the “unfitness” inquiry is for the
court to find some nexus between the defendant’s act of fraud and the
need for a bar. 133 The defendant and the public must receive some explanation for the court’s decision, and the appellate courts need to see a
basis for the trial court’s conclusion, to determine whether the lower
court abused its discretion.
While the test was applied too stringently in Patel, these courts
have allowed it to become too lenient. If Congress had intended courts
to impose a bar for every commission of fraud, it would have dispensed
with the “unfitness” requirement all together. Courts should continue to
engage in the unfitness inquiry by providing a full and clear analysis of
the law and facts of each case.
Each of the above categories of court action is an example of a
common problem: courts have responded to the amended language in
Sarbanes-Oxley with unacceptable applications of the new “unfitness”
standard. Ignorance of the amendment and erroneous adherence to
States); SEC v. Maxxon, No. 02-CV-975-H(J), 2005 WL 6090229, at *5 (N.D. Okla.
Mar. 11, 2005) (acknowledging “unfitness” as standard and noting defendant’s ongoing and egregious pattern of fraudulent misconduct, but temporarily barring defendant without finding a likelihood of recurrence).
130. The most likely explanation for these decisions is that these courts continue to
look to judicial precedent for guidance and do not realize that the amendment of the bar
statute was intended to correct problems within that body of precedent.
131. One of the few courts to openly address the amended language of the bar
statute was the D.C. District in SEC v. Levine, 517 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2007). For
a discussion of the Levine case, see infra Part III.B.
132. See, e.g., SEC v. Henke, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
133. Barnard, Substantially Unfit to Serve?, supra note 42, at 1494.
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Patel’s still-powerful influence in the courts may be the explanation.
Another possibility is that courts are concerned about the harsh consequences of an officer and director bar and are quietly adjusting their legal analysis in an effort to limit those consequences. Still, some courts
appear only too willing to bar a defendant without setting forth a clear
and rational basis for their decision. The officer and director bar was
intended to be a powerful deterrent and remedy for fraudulent misconduct but, as with all SEC sanctions, the interest of the public in fair
and efficient markets must be balanced with the interests of the defendant. 134 Before the officer and director bar can operate as intended, courts
must respond to the amended standard by developing a fair and workable test for determining whether a defendant is unfit.
III.
Courts could depart in several ways from the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley
case law to adjust the test from one that determines “substantial
unfitness” to one that determines “unfitness.” At least one federal district court has already attempted to develop a test to determine a defendant’s “unfitness.” 135 That court’s test is offered here as a potential solution. As with most human endeavors, however, the simplest solution is
likely the most effective. If Congress meant Sarbanes-Oxley to overrule
certain aspects of the Patel holding, then courts should proceed with the
six factors without those offending parts.
In creating a test to determine whether a defendant is unfit to serve
as an executive of a public company, courts and commentators should be
willing to rethink the purposes of the officer and director bar. Congress
provided two chief purposes in the Remedies Act’s legislative history:
deterrence and protection of public investors from proven violators.136
Congress also charged courts with the duty to balance the government’s
interest in obtaining a bar 137 with the defendant’s interest in retaining his
or her means of making a living. 138 Any proposed solution to this
lingering “unfitness” problem should serve the purposes of the bar and
134.
135.
136.

SEC v. Steadman, 603 F.2d 1126, 1139 (5th Cir. 1979).
Levine, 517 F. Supp. at 144-46.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 27 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379,

1394.
137. The SEC is ultimately interested in protection of shareholders and the honesty,
integrity, and efficiency of the market. Id. at 1381.
138. Steadman, 603 F.2d at 1139-40.
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promote fairness by maintaining the proper balance between the
interests of the government and the defendant.
A. Proposed Test for Determining Whether Defendant is Unfit to Serve
This Note suggests that courts acknowledge the Sarbanes-Oxley
amendment and seek to determine a defendant’s “unfitness” through
consideration and analysis of the Steadman-Barnard six factors. No single factor should be dispositive; courts should even be prepared to impose a bar in the absence of any of the listed factors, as long as they provide a reasoned analysis of their conclusion that the defendant is unfit to
serve as a director or officer. The advantage of this solution is that it
creates flexibility by allowing courts to examine and present the facts of
each case against a variety of considerations without making any factor
or combination of factors dispositive of “unfitness” or “fitness.” Furthermore, this method is the least disruptive to the existing body of
precedents and is consistent with the purposes of the Remedies Act and
Sarbanes-Oxley. 139
This proposed “unfitness” test satisfies Congress’s intent by resolving the major problem with Patel, specifically, the requirement that the
SEC show one of the six “considerations” in every case before the court
may issue a bar order. 140 Because securities fraud occurs in a variety of
forms, the “unfitness” inquiry must be sufficiently flexible to protect the
market from unscrupulous corporate fiduciaries. 141 The proposed solution provides an appropriate level of flexibility. Whereas Patel required
a clear showing of one factor, the new test would permit the presence of
some factors to make up for the absence of others. Thus, a court could
impose an officer and director bar without being rigidly forced to show
any particular factor or combination of factors.
The proposed test is the least disruptive interpretation of the
Sarbanes-Oxley amendment because it adheres to the basic six-factor
test found in Patel and the rest of the officer and director bar cases,
while dispensing with the problematic legal holdings of those cases.
Furthermore, it is consistent with Steadman and the long line of SEC
enforcement case law. 142
The new test is flexible enough to be applied to a wide array of cor139.
140.
141.
142.

See supra Parts I.C and I.E.
See supra Part I.E.
See id.
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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porate misconduct. Congress clearly favored such flexibility when it established the officer and director bar in the Remedies Act. 143 In addition, courts have long been wary of rigid definitions in federal securities
laws. 144 A rigid or static definition or test invites clever minds to circumvent the protections provided by the law. 145 In the same way,
“unfitness” should not be a static concept, which may be the reason
Congress left it undefined. 146 Any workable test for “unfitness” must be
flexible enough to address the many forms of misconduct that may occur
in the market, and must also be able to adapt as the market grows and
changes. Such flexibility has long been the hallmark in securities law147
and is consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley, which was a reaction to previously unimaginable corporate scandals. 148 It is also consistent with the
purposes of both the Remedies Act and Sarbanes-Oxley, which sought
to provide the SEC with an effective remedy and deterrent. 149
The proposed test is fair and provides courts with an appropriate
level of discretion to impose or deny an officer and director bar. A
permanent officer and director bar is an extraordinary sanction to impose
on a corporate executive and may interfere with shareholders’ right to
select firm managers. 150 At the same time, the officer and director bar is
an effective way to keep untrustworthy executives out of the management teams of public companies and to send a strong signal to the market that misconduct will not be tolerated. 151 In considering these competing interests, Congress has stated the following:
Some commentators have suggested that a court ordered bar infringes upon the right of shareholders to determine for themselves
who should serve as their elected management. However, public
143.
144.

S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 2, 7 (1990).
See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (asserting a
definition for “investment contract” with sufficient flexibility to “meet the countless and
variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the
promise of profits”).
145. Id.
146. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
147. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
148. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 194-208.
149. See supra Parts I.B and I.E.
150. Barnard, Substantially Unfit to Serve?, supra note 42, at 1490-91.
151. Congress intended the officer and director bar to serve two principal purposes:
assurance to public investors that the securities markets are safe and deterrence of
corporate misconduct. H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 27 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1394.
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shareholders may lack sufficient control to remove securities law
violators from office or otherwise to protect their own interests. In
addition, in some cases, the shareholders may have been the direct
beneficiaries of the wrongdoing and thus may have little economic
incentive to vote out the violators. Moreover, broader public
interests are involved when the actions of the violator undermine the
152
integrity of the markets.

The proposed test allows courts the flexibility to consider any
combination of the six factors and reach a conclusion that balances these
competing interests and provides a fair and effective result in each case.
Courts should make full use of the factual record and explain their findings in each case. Once courts begin to apply the suggested test, the
developing body of case law will guide later courts and litigants in determining the likelihood or appropriateness of imposing a bar in any given
situation.
Finally, the proposed test resolves the problems with prior case law,
particularly Patel, as well as any ambiguity in Professor Barnard’s sixfactor test. Patel’s fundamental problem was that it required the government to demonstrate that the defendant was likely to engage in future
misconduct before a bar could be imposed. 153 Professor Barnard likewise stated that this one factor – the defendant’s likelihood of recurrence
– was at the core of the “unfitness” inquiry 154 and admonished Congress
to amend the bar statutes with language requiring the SEC to show the
defendant’s likelihood of recurrence in every case. 155 Nevertheless,
Congress has taken the position that an officer and director bar is especially appropriate where corporate executives have engaged in egregious
fraud without regard for the defendant’s likelihood of recurrence. 156
Furthermore, the legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley indicates that the
statute was amended in response to cases like Patel. 157 Under the proposed “unfitness” test, the government would be able to obtain a bar
against defendants like Patel without demonstrating the defendant’s likelihood of future misconduct, so long as it could show other factors, such

152.
153.
154.
155.

S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 18 (1990).
See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
Barnard, Substantially Unfit to Serve?, supra note 42, at 1517.
Jayne W. Barnard, The SEC’s Suspension and Bar Powers in Perspective, 76
TUL. L. REV. 1253, 1271-72 (2002).
156. S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 17.
157. S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 26-27 (2002).
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as egregiousness, scienter, and the fact that the defendant is a corporate
fiduciary.
B. Professor Barnard’s Nine-Factor Test for Determining “Unfitness”
An alternative solution to that suggested by this Note is a proposal
by Professor Barnard in a 2005 law review article. 158 Barnard suggested
that courts determine “unfitness” by considering the following nine
factors:
(1) the nature and complexity of the scheme, (2) the defendant’s role
in the scheme, (3) the use of corporate resources in executing the
scheme, (4) the defendant’s financial gain (or loss avoidance) from
the scheme, (5) the loss to investors and others as a result of that
scheme, (6) whether the scheme represents an isolated occurrence or
a pattern or misconduct, (7) the defendant’s use of stealth and
concealment, (8) the defendant’s history of business and related misconduct, and (9) the defendant’s acknowledgement of wrongdoing
159
and the credibility of his contrition.

Here, Professor Barnard suggests that courts not consider the list
exhaustive nor any of the factors dispositive. 160 Additionally, while she
urges courts to raise the SEC’s burden of proof from preponderance of
the evidence to clear and convincing evidence, 161 she also seems to suggest that a court may find a defendant unfit without all factors being
present. 162
At least one court has applied Professor Barnard’s new formulation. 163 The court in SEC v. Levine, unlike most other courts following
Sarbanes-Oxley, expressly acknowledged that Congress had amended

158. Jayne W. Barnard, Rule 10-b and the “Unfitness” Question, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 9
(2005) [hereinafter Barnard, The “Unfitness” Question].
159. Id. at 46.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 45. It is highly unlikely that any court would raise the burden of proof
from preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence. See SEC v.
Steadman, 603 F.2d 1126, 1139 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that preponderance of the
evidence is the proper standard in all SEC enforcement and disbarment actions as any
higher standard would be detrimental to the public interest).
162. See Barnard, The “Unfitness” Question, supra note 158, at 47 (suggesting that
courts find unfitness in cases of high egregiousness, “especially when some of the other
factors listed below are present” (emphasis added)).
163. SEC v. Levine, 517 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2007).
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the officer and director bar statutes and appropriately sought a method
for determining the new, reduced “unfitness” standard. 164 Ultimately,
the Levine court barred the defendant for ten years, a sanction reminiscent of Patel’s insistence that courts favor temporary officer and
director bars over permanent bars. 165 Furthermore, the court pointed to
the defendant’s active management of a public company at all times
during the trial as evidence that the defendant was likely to be involved
in future misconduct. 166 This suggests that the Levine court was not
acting independent of the influence of Patel. That is not surprising,
however, because Professor Barnard’s nine-factor test strongly encourages courts to find that the defendant is likely to engage in future
misconduct before imposing a bar. 167
Professor Barnard’s nine-factor test has both positive and negative
attributes. On the one hand, it is undeniably flexible because it provides
courts with nine possible considerations rather than six. These considerations may prove useful for courts that have reached a stalemate in
applying the six-factor test and need more factors to reach a conclusion.
On the other hand, Professor Barnard indicates that, in addition to considering the nine factors, courts should find that the defendant is likely
to engage in future misconduct before imposing a bar. 168 In this way,
the new test ignores the most critical meaning of the “unfitness”
standard: neither the defendant’s likelihood of recurrence nor any other
particular factor should be required. 169 The addition of new factors
without the resolution of this issue signals a return to the Patel
framework, and is therefore not a solution that seeks to honor
Congressional intent in Sarbanes-Oxley. This Note suggests that courts
should not so thwart the will of Congress. Congress overruled Patel’s
static formulation of the “substantial unfitness” test in Sarbanes-Oxley
and demonstrated its desire that courts develop and use a more flexible
standard. 170

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 144.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 131-32.
Barnard, The “Unfitness” Question, supra note 158, at 15.
Id.
See supra Part I.E.
See id.
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C. Comparison of the Proposed Test and Professor Barnard’s
Nine-Factor Test
To illustrate the differences between the “unfitness” test proposed
by this Note and Professor Barnard’s nine-factor test, I will apply both
tests to the facts of the Patel case, and compare the results. This
comparison will highlight the strengths of the proposed test and the
weaknesses of the alternative nine-factor test.
The Proposed Test
Applying the proposed test to the facts of Patel, 171 the six factors
break down as follows:
(1) Egregiousness of the Underlying Violation: The violation
was egregious because it resulted in enormous shareholder
losses, it involved a scheme to defraud the FDA, and it
showed a blatant disregard for public safety. This favors a
bar.
(2) Defendant’s Repeat Offender Status: The defendant has no
past violations of law. This favors denial of a bar.
(3) Defendant’s Role in the Fraud: The defendant was an officer
of the corporation and an active participant. This favors a
bar.
(4) Defendant’s Degree of Scienter: The defendant’s fraudulent
acts were not negligent, but rather were intentional or highly
reckless; the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that the scheme to defraud the FDA was illegal and
that, if caught, the company’s stock price would plummet.
Furthermore, the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that he defrauded investors who purchased his shares
in the selloff prior to the public announcement of the
indictment. This favors a bar.
(5) Defendant’s Economic Stake in the Violation: The defendant’s scheme initially increased the company’s value by
making it appear highly competitive; the defendant then sold
a block of his shares to avoid the inevitable losses. This
favors a bar, though the defendant may argue that the loss

171.

See supra Part I.D for a discussion of the Patel case.
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avoided was not large in comparison with total shareholder
losses and the total amount of stock he held.
(6) Likelihood that Misconduct Will Recur: The defendant’s
scheme was ongoing and showed his blatant disregard for
laws protecting prescription drug users and public investors.
This factor does not clearly favor a bar. That is, simply
restating the facts of the underlying violation may not be sufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of recurrence, especially
if the defendant has accepted responsibility for his actions.
Nevertheless, applying the five factor test currently used by
courts to determine the likelihood of recurrence when
issuing an injunction, a court may find a likelihood of future
misconduct. The scheme was ongoing and continuous, the
violation evidenced a high level of scienter, and the nature of
the defendant’s profession places him at risk for future
violations. 172
Under the proposed test, a court could find the defendant unfit to
serve as the manager of a public company. Even if the defendant has no
history of past violations, or if the court is not convinced that the SEC
has established a likelihood of future misconduct, the court may still
impose a bar if, in its discretion, it is convinced that the egregiousness of
the violation, the high level of scienter, and the defendant’s role as a
corporate fiduciary at the time of the fraud render the defendant unfit.
Professor Barnard’s Nine-Factor Test
Applying Professor Barnard’s more recent nine-factor test 173 to the
facts in Patel, 174 a court may find as follows:
(1) The Nature and Complexity of the Scheme: The scheme was
complex, as it involved a conspiracy with FDA staff and was
unlikely to be discovered without the intervention of a
federal investigation. The scheme endangered the public and
introduced false information about the company into the
172. See, e.g., SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 587, 611
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
173. See Barnard, The “Unfitness” Question, supra note 158, at 46-53 (listing and
discussing the factors).
174. See supra Part I.D.
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securities market, resulting in shareholder losses. This
favors a bar.
The Defendant’s Role in the Scheme: The defendant served
as a corporate fiduciary while engaging in the fraud and may
have had a leadership role in the scheme. This favors a bar.
The Use of Corporate Resources in Executing the Scheme:
The defendant may have used corporate resources or time to
engage in the fraud, but there are no facts that firmly
establish this. This favors denial of a bar.
The Defendant’s Financial Gain (or Loss Avoidance) from
the Scheme: The defendant profited from the scheme,
though the amount of profit and loss avoidance may not be
sufficient to find the defendant unfit. This factor may or
may not favor a bar.
The Loss to Investors and Others as a Result of the Scheme:
The defendant’s scheme caused a major decline in the price
of the company’s publicly traded stock and shareholders
likely suffered heavy losses. This favors a bar.
Whether the Scheme Represents an Isolated Occurrence or a
Pattern of Misconduct: The conspiracy with the FDA staff
was ongoing, but the illegal sell-off of company stock occurred only once. This may or may not favor a bar
The Defendant’s Use of Stealth and Concealment: There are
no facts suggesting that the defendant absconded with funds
or altered financial documents. This favors denial of a bar.
The Defendant’s History of Business and Related Misconduct: Besides the ongoing nature of the fraudulent misconduct, the defendant does not have any prior history of
violations. This may or may not favor a bar.
The Defendant’s Acknowledgement of Wrongdoing and the
Credibility of His Contrition: The defendant admitted his
role in the scheme and conceded that it was fraud, but there
are no facts to show defendant’s contrition. This may or
may not favor a bar.

If the nine factors in Professor Barnard’s test are considered disjunctively, a court may find the defendant unfit to serve as a corporate
fiduciary of a public company. Nevertheless, if courts apply Professor
Barnard’s suggestion that the SEC must also show that the defendant is
likely to engage in future misconduct unless barred, the nine-factor test
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essentially merges with the holding in Patel, and the end result of
Sarbanes-Oxley amendment would be nothing more than a transformation of the six-factor test into a nine-factor test.
The purpose of this comparison is to show that neither the six-factor
test nor the nine-factor test presents a problem so long as the court is
free to consider each factor disjunctively and exercise its discretion in
determining the defendant’s fitness to serve. Requiring the courts to
make a positive finding of the defendant’s likelihood of recurrence, or
elevating any other particular factor above the others will always present
a problem. It is precisely that problem that Congress sought to rectify in
Sarbanes-Oxley. If the SEC can establish that the defendant is likely to
engage in future violations, it could easily obtain an officer and director
bar as a form of ancillary injunctive relief, and the officer and director
bar statutes would be unnecessary. For the officer and director bar statutes to be effective, the test for “unfitness” must be flexible enough to
apply to the wide range of possible acts of securities fraud.
CONCLUSION
Congress amended the officer and director bar statutes in SarbanesOxley in an effort to increase the accountability of corporate managers
who engage in securities fraud. The Sarbanes-Oxley legislative history
indicates Congress’s intent to overrule prior case law and invite courts to
establish a more flexible standard for determining when an officer and
director bar is appropriate. This Note suggests that courts continue to
adhere to a variation of the six-factor test applied in those early cases
and apply the factors disjunctively. Unlike those cases overruled by
Sarbanes-Oxley, the test proposed by this Note does not require courts to
establish the defendant’s likelihood of future violations or any single
factor of “unfitness” in particular before imposing a bar. Rather, the
proposed test encourages courts to consider a wide range of aggravating
factors, as well as a positive finding of securities fraud, before determining that an officer and director bar is appropriate.

